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1. INTRODUCTION.
In order to assign content to a wide range of context sensitive utterances audiences must rely heavily
on their knowledge of the conversational context.  Because of this reliance on context there are
many ways the recovery of content can go wrong.  As a result, speakers are able to make assertions
and yet deny responsibility for the proposition asserted, claiming that the audience made a mistake
in resolving the context sensitivity.  That is, speakers are able to maintain plausible deniability about
what  is  said.   Call  this  the 'deniability problem'.   The aim of  this  paper  is  to  explain why the
deniability problem is problematic, and start to identify the range of utterances to which it applies.
Elizabeth Fricker (2012) has pushed a similar line of reasoning, arguing that implicatures fail to
carry  the  epistemic  force  of  outright  assertions.   She  argues  that  speakers  maintain  plausible
deniability about the implicature, meaning that they fail to undertake the commitments necessary to
transmit testimonial knowledge.  I start by outlining Fricker's view, and arguing that it potentially
applies to a far wider range of utterances than those she considers, including many assertions. I then
go into greater detail explaining exactly why this is worrying.  
The deniability problem is problematic for three reasons.  Firstly, many views of testimony (for
example,  'telling'  based  views  of  testimony such  as  Fricker  (2006a),  Hinchman  (2005),  Moran
(2005a, 2005b), and  Ross (1986)) emphasise the role of speaker commitments in the justification of
testimonial beliefs.  The deniability problem entails that speakers often fail to undertake the types of
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told p they gain a reason to believe p in virtue of the speaker having publicly taken responsibility for
the audience's belief that p.  However, when the speaker maintains plausible deniability about what
is said no such commitment is undertaken.  Secondly, plausible deniability prevents epistemic buck
passing.  Sanford Goldberg (2006), and Benjamin McMyler (2013) have argued that the ability to
pass the epistemic buck in response to challenges to one's belief is a distinctive epistemic right
agents  gain  only  in  virtue  of  forming  testimonial  beliefs.   This  diminishes  the  belief  holder's
responsibility  for  their  testimonial  belief  as  compared  to  beliefs  formed  via  other  methods.
However, when the speaker maintains plausible deniability the audience loses the ability to pass the
epistemic buck, and thus fails  to gain the epistemic rights distinctive of testimonial knowledge.
Finally,  the  ability  to  maintain  plausible  deniability  blocks  one  of  the  primary disincentives  to
deceptive or careless assertion.  
After explaining why the deniability problem is problematic I focus on identifying the range of
utterances  to  which  it  applies.   I  outline  a  puzzle  arising  from the  recent  debate  over  context
sensitivity  in  the  philosophy of  language,  which  seems  to  suggest  that  the  deniability  problem
extends to a very large number of utterances.  The puzzle is as follows - on the one hand it has been
argued that there is widespread context sensitivity in natural language,  and audiences must rely
heavily on their knowledge of the context to recover the speaker's intended meaning.  This includes
cases which we would intuitively treat as being on a par with normal testimony.  On the other hand,
Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (2004) have argued that such widespread context sensitivity
would  make  communication  miraculous,  pointing  to  the  same  'problematic  epistemics'  which,
according  to  Fricker  (2012),  give  rise  to  plausible  deniability.   If  context  sensitivity  is  very
widespread, but  has the same 'problematic epistemics' that Fricker identifies for implicature, then
the deniability problem is extremely far reaching.  This would be a worrying and radical result.
3Thankfully this result can be avoided, or at least weakened.  There have been several contextualist
responses to Cappelen and Lepore which aim to establish that widespread context sensitivity does
not  make  communication  miraculous.  These  responses  don't  work  as  general  solutions  to  the
deniability problem, however they do allow us to limit its scope.  We end up with a set of criteria for
identifying  discourses  which  are  particularly  susceptible  to  the  deniability  problem.   In  the
conclusion I suggest some important discourses which may still face the deniability problem. 
2. THE DENIABILITY PROBLEM.
Because  of  what  Fricker  calls  the  'ambiguous  epistemics'  of  implicature  speakers  are  able  to
maintain plausible deniability about what they have implied.  That is, they maintain the ability to
deny that they ever intended to imply what the audience takes them to have implied.  I take it that
such a denial will involve the construction of a believable narrative in which the speaker's attitudes
and expectations at the time of utterance were such that they could reasonably make their utterance
without intending to imply what they were taken to have implied.  More precisely: 
Plausible deniability -  An agent has plausible deniability about intending to communicate a
proposition p with an utterance u of a sentence s if that agent is able to tell a story (with at
least  some degree  of  believability1)  about  their  attitudes  and expectations  at  the  time of
utterance such that a reasonable agent with those attitudes and expectations could utter s with
no intention to communicate p. 
The plausibility of the denial will depend on the plausibility of the story about the agent's attitudes.
In order to be plausible the story will have to be consistent with what the audience knows about the
1 Plausible deniability is clearly a gradable notion since some denials will be more plausible than others.  In section five 
we will consider some factors which might make some denials more plausible than others. 
4speaker's  attitudes  and  beliefs.   That  we  have  such  plausible  deniability  about  implicatures  is
illustrated by the following example: 
Implicature:  Matt is running out of fuel and needs some fast.  He stops and asks a stranger
where he can get some fuel.  The stranger says 'there is a gas station around the corner'.  The
stranger thereby implies (implicitly communicates) that the gas station is open and has fuel.
However, if Matt were to get to the gas station and find it closed or out of gas he would have
a hard time criticising the stranger for her utterance.  She could easily maintain that she never
intended to communicate that the gas station was open or that it had gas.  She can maintain
that she was merely suggesting it as a place to try (she could maintain this even if she in fact
knew that the gas station was shut or had no gas).  
When Fricker talks of 'ambiguous epistemics' she refers to the way audiences and speakers must rely
on  what  she  calls  'knowledge  context'  (or  'K-context')  in  order  to  recover  the  communicated
message.   Knowledge context is the audience's representation of factors such as mutual knowledge,
past utterances, Gricean norms, the mutual goals of the conversation, and any other information
generally relevant to interpretation other than basic knowledge of the syntax and invariant semantic
content of the utterance.   Because of the many complex ways in which audiences must rely on
context in order to recover an implicature there are many ways the process can go wrong.  For
example,  the  audience  could  employ an  aspect  of  knowledge  context  which  the  speaker  never
intended them to employ, or they could fail to employ an aspect of knowledge context that the
speaker did intend them to employ.  Likewise, they could hold false beliefs about the context, or at
least beliefs which were not mutual knowledge, and appeal to such beliefs in their recovery of the
implicature.  Because the recovery of implicatures can go wrong in so many ways the speaker is
able  to  deny responsibility for the proposition the audience recovers,  claiming that  there was a
5mismatch  between  what  the  audience  recovered  and  what  the  speaker  intended  (perhaps  even
claiming the speaker didn't intend any implicature at all)2.  Fricker's own take on the problem is as
follows: 
Entirely genuine misunderstandings and mistakings are endemically liable to happen, 
regarding a supposed message that is conversationally implied, not stated, due to the very 
complex mutual epistemics of the situation. Given these complex epistemics, it is not 
epistemically feasible to pin undeniable specific commitment onto a speaker: she can always 
wriggle out of it. This may be in bad faith; but very often it may not—maybe she 
miscalculated what her audience would infer; maybe she had not really figured it out.  
(Fricker 2012: 87)
Since the claim that she intended to communicate E turns on claims about her private 
intentions and K-context, including her second order representations of others’ beliefs, she 
can always get away with denying that she intended any such thing; even if her denial is 
made in bad faith. Lies about my own intentions and other mental states may be suspected, 
but cannot be refuted. In contrast, when someone makes an explicit statement of a fact P, 
what she signs up to in doing so—taking responsibility for the truth of P—is a public fact 
about the situation, determined by semantics and objective features of context. So it cannot 
2It has been pointed out by an anonymous reviewer that this problem actually cuts both ways.  In some cases contextual 
indeterminacy seems to grant audiences the freedom to recover the meaning they find most convenient.  The reviewer 
provides the following example :  One's partner may say that they are going to have coffee at the local café, and one 
might interpret them as meaning that they are going to the café now, using it as an excuse to drink the last of the coffee.  
One might do this even if one knows that they might be planning to go later (in which case they may still want some of 
the remaining coffee).  I think this raises some interesting questions about the way in which speech acts make various 
courses of action permissible.  However, there is not enough space to give this issue a proper treatment here. 
6be incorrigibly denied by the speaker. I can be nailed as having stated that P; never as having
insinuated that P. (ibid: 88-89)
Fricker seems to suggest that the deniability problem only applies to implicatures, suggesting that
plausible  deniability  is  never  available  regarding  the  primary  content  of  one's  utterance.   The
thought is that one can deny that one intended to imply anything without descending into absurdity.
However, if one makes an intelligible declarative utterance one cannot,  without descending into
absurdity, claim that one never intended to communicate anything. This may be true, but one can
still maintain plausible deniability about intending the particular proposition the audience recovered
without claiming that one never intended to communicate anything at all. To see that speakers do
attempt such conversational manoeuvres with asserted contents as well as implicatures consider the
following two examples (the first of which occupies a grey area between what is implied and what is
asserted, the second of which clearly concerns asserted content)3:
Scalar implicature:  We are planning a group trip to a theme park and deciding how many 
cars to take.  I wish to cause logistical problems because I hate fun, so I say 'Matt has three 
kids' knowing that he has five.  On the day of the trip Matt arrives with his five children and 
we don't have enough space in the car.  You challenge me for saying that Matt had only three 
children.  However, I might attempt to maintain that I didn't mean he had only three children,
I meant that he had at least three children, so we would need at least three additional seats.  
3  As we move through the examples from the clear case of implicature to the case of mere context sensitivity the stories 
the speaker tells start to sound slightly less plausible.  They would certainly raise our suspicions, and if a speaker 
frequently made manoeuvres like these then we would consider them untrustworthy.  This is a point to which I will 
return when discussing responses to the problem.  For now it suffices to note that on one-off occasions we would usually
let such matters slide and speakers would usually get away with making such conversational manoeuvres.  This is not to 
say that they wouldn't be criticised for being unclear, simply that they would not be held to what they communicated. 
7The plausibility of such a story will depend on the way I said 'Matt has three kids' and the 
immediate preceding utterances, however we rarely recall such minute details of the 
conversational context, so it would not be difficult to construct a plausible story on which I 
intended to communicate only that Matt has at least three children.
Quantifier domain restriction: It is the start of a new year and we have organised a party for
the new graduate students.  We have a variety of beers on offer, but there are some special
craft lagers I want for myself (even though they were brought for the guests).  I have stored
most of the beer in the fridge, but I have put the craft lagers outside.  Sally, one of the new
students, arrives and asks where the beer is, so I tell her 'every beer is in the fridge'.  Later on
you find the craft lagers outside and ask me why I told Sally that every beer was in the
fridge.  In response to this challenge I might attempt to construct a story along the following
lines:  I had heard that Sally was a vegan, and I am aware that craft lagers often contain
animal products.  So when I said 'every beer is in the fridge' I didn't mean every beer we had
purchased for the party, I meant every beer which was safe for Sally, as a vegan, to drink. 
In  these examples  the  speaker  attempted to  construct  a  narrative concerning their  attitudes  and
representations of the context in which the audience's  recovered meaning was not intended.  In
general, if recovery of an asserted content requires extensive appeal to knowledge context then the
speaker  will  often  be  able  to  claim  that  the  audience  recovered  the  wrong  proposition,  thus
disclaiming responsibility for the audience's belief.  Therefore, if heavy duty appeal to knowledge
context is often required for recovering what is said, and this appeal to knowledge context gives rise
to the same possibilities of error to which implicature gives rise, then the deniability problem will
apply to a wide range of assertions, not just implicatures. 
8Before moving on it is worth clarifying what is meant when I talk about 'recovering the content of
an utterance' or 'recovering what is said'. This is important both for the sake of appreciating the
deniability problem and also in order to eliminate an objection which threatens the project of this
paper from the outset4.  In the examples I have given the hearers come to believe some fine grained
proposition, and the speaker is able to maintain plausible deniability by claiming that a different fine
grained proposition was intended.  It might be thought that in reality we only come to believe far
more coarse grained propositions, for example the disjunction of all the propositions the speaker
could plausibly claim to have meant.  After all, it might be thought that we often fail to consciously
assign particular fine grained values to contextual variables.   Moreover,  the deniability problem
breaks down on the view that we recover the disjunction of the propositions that the speaker could
plausibly have meant.  The speaker cannot plausibly deny having meant to communicate something
at least  as strong as the proposition recovered if  the proposition recovered is  the disjunction of
propositions the speaker could plausibly claim to have meant. 
I think this line of reasoning is problematic because it relies on an unrealistic view of testimonial
belief  formation.   We  frequently  do  form  testimonial  beliefs  in  fine  grained  non-disjunctive
propositions when there are other propositions the speaker could have claimed to have meant.   For
example,  consider  the  above  case  of  scalar  implicature:  on  the  disjunctive  view  the  recovered
proposition communicated would be 'Matt has either exactly three kids or at least three kids'.  The
problem is that this just collapses into 'Matt has at least three kids', yet it is plausible that we often
take utterances like 'Matt has three kids' to communicate that Matt has exactly three children.  On
the disjunctive view such readings would be rare.  Moreover, the range of situations an imaginative
speaker would be able conjure up in order to claim that a miscommunication has occurred will often
be  rather  wide,  and  an  unimaginative  hearer  (or  just  a  hearer  who is  interpreting  quickly  and
unreflectively) is unlikely to consider (consciously or subconsciously) the whole range of cases a
4 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this objection. 
9speaker could construct.  Thus hearers will be able to infer little from what they have been told due
to the level of uncertainty over exactly what it is that they have been told.  Consider the quantifier
case again.   I  mentioned one story the speaker could conjure up in order to  maintain plausible
deniability, however there are many more.  For example, the speaker might attempt to claim that
'beer' and 'lager' are distinct, and that the question Sally asked was asked about beer (some people do
consider  this  to  be  an  important  distinction),  or  the  speaker  could  maintain  that  the  intended
interpretation was 'every beer which is ready to drink', claiming that the beer left outside was still
warm at the time of utterance.  On the disjunctive view the proposition the hearer recovers would be
'every beer for the party is in the fridge, or every vegan friendly beer is in the fridge, or.....'.  It is not
clear why Sally would consider all these readings (especially if she is not actually a vegan), and
even if she did she would not be entitled to assume that there is no other unconsidered situation the
speaker could conjure up in order to claim miscommunication.  Thus really all she would be entitled
to take from the utterance would be that there is some beer in the fridge.  However, we frequently
take much more from such utterances.  This is evidenced by the fact that Sally may well be surprised
to find the craft lagers outside, or she may assume they were someone's private stash.  She would
not be so disposed unless she had come to believe something like 'every beer for the party is in the
fridge' (she may not have explicitly considered such a restriction, but this does not rule out forming
a dispositional or unconscious belief with such a domain restriction).  So I consider the disjunctive
view to be implausible.  
A alternative (perhaps more plausible) way of spelling out the disjunctive view holds that audiences
do not take speakers to mean 'p or  q or...', but rather that audiences come to believe 'the speaker
means p, or the speaker means q, or....'5.  This view faces many of the same problems however, as
the audience is  still  only able  to  draw a disjunctive conclusion about  the subject  matter  of  the
assertion.  For example, suppose I assert 'Matt has three kids', and the audience forms the belief
5 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this altervative version of the disjunctive view. 
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'Either S meant 'Matt as exactly three kids' or S meant 'Matt has at least three kids'.  The audience
will only be able to draw a disjunctive conclusion about the number of children Matt has.  That is,
they will at best be warranted in forming the belief   'Matt has either exactly three kids or at least
three kids'. This clashes with the fact that we would often form the belief that Matt has exactly three
children upon hearing 'Matt has three kids'.  Other problems remain too.  For example, it still seems
likely that the range of interpretations an imaginative speaker would be able to conjure far outstrip
the number of interpretations the audience is likely to consider when forming their disjunctive view
about  what  the  speaker  might  have  meant.   Thus,  although this  modification  of  the  view does
perhaps seem more realistic, it still faces many of the same problems. 
This is not to say that I believe we always recover only a single fine grained proposition.  There may
often be some degree of indeterminacy or uncertainty about the precise proposition (or propositions)
communicated.  However, my contention is that in cases where the mechanisms employed in the
recovery of what is said give rise to many error possibilities the range of propositions an imaginative
speaker can claim to have intended will often be significantly larger than the range of propositions
over which a typical hearer's state of understanding will be indeterminate.  Thus speakers will often
be able to maintain plausible deniability about having intended any of the precisifications of the
audience's interpretation6.  By reviewing some of the literature on linguistic context sensitivity we
will be able to assess the extent to which the mechanisms employed in the recovery of what is said
give rise to the sorts of error possibilities which allow for the deniability problem.  However, before
6 A related concern is that audiences needn't settle on a single precise interpretation, they may settle on several.  The 
problem with this response is that it is unclear whether we can differentiate between settling on several different 
interpretations and settling on a single interpretation identical to the conjunction of those interpretations.  Moreover, 
even if we did form testimonial beliefs in this way it would not prevent the speaker from maintaining plausible 
deniabiliy over individual interpretations.  In fact, although the strategy of settling on multiple interpretations would 
no doubt increase the chance of the audience settling on the correct interpretation it would also vastly increase the 
risk that at least one of the several interpretations settled upon would be incorrect. 
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doing so it is important that we clarify exactly why the deniability problem is such a problem.
3. WHY IS THE DENIABILITY PROBLEM A PROBLEM?
In the previous section I outlined the deniability problem, and argued that there is no principled
reason to hold that it applies only to implicature.  The problem, as it applies to assertions, can be
stated as follows: usually when one makes an assertion with a clear propositional content  p one
undertakes a commitment to p.  That is, one undertakes a commitment to defend one's belief in, and
assertion of p, or else retract the assertion.  This commitment is made public in the act of assertion
(see  MacFarlane  (2005,  2011),  and Rescorla  (2009)  for  views of  assertion  which  place  special
emphasis on this fact).  However, in certain cases one has another option available when challenged
- one is able to deny that the audience recovered the intended proposition.  Call this alternative
conversational  move  the  'mismatch  move'.   When  the  mismatch  move  is  available  no  public
commitment  is  undertaken  to  defend  one's  assertion  or  provide  epistemic  justification  for  the
proposition seemingly asserted.
In this section I will explain why we should be worried by the deniability problem.  We should be
worried about the deniability problem because the commitments speakers undertake plausibly play
an important role in justifying our testimonial beliefs, and in shaping the epistemic rights we acquire
when we form testimonial beliefs.  The presence of the deniability problem indicates that speakers
are able to back out of certain commitments, meaning that the commitments are unable to perform
their justificatory or rights shaping roles. 
I start by discussing the justificatory role played by speaker commitments.  I focus primarily on
Fricker's  own  view  (in  order  to  further  explicate  her  take  on  the  problem)  and  the  assurance
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theorists,  who  press  the  role  of  commitments  intentionally  incurred.   The  commitments  so
emphasised seem especially susceptible to plausible deniability, thus the deniability problem seems
to be particularly worrying for the assurance theorist7.  I will then briefly consider the extent to
which  the  deniability  problem might  be  seen  to  extend  beyond  views  such as  Fricker's  or  the
assurance  theorist's.   Next  I  outline  the  role  speaker  commitments  have  been  taken  to  play in
shaping the epistemic rights we acquire as a result of forming testimonial beliefs.  Sanford Goldberg
(2006), and Benjamin McMyler (2013) have argued that the commitments speakers undertake when
testifying shape the epistemic rights of the audience with respect to their testimonial belief. The
presence of the deniability problem causes problems for the acquisition of these epistemic rights.
Finally I argue that the presence of the deniability problem blocks one of the primary disincentives
to deception.  
3.1 Fricker and the Assurance Theorists.
Fricker  frames  her  discussion  in  terms  of  what  she  takes  to  be  the  paradigmatic  mode  of
transmission of knowledge via testimony - the act of telling.  She argues that by telling an audience
that p speakers vouch for, and take responsibility for, the truth of p.  In telling someone that p the
speaker presents p as being true in an act the import of which is that the hearer can form a belief in p
on her say so (Fricker (2006a)).  This act licences the audience to believe that p in virtue of the fact
that  it  is  the 'conventionally constituted force of  her  speech act'  that  in  asserting  p the speaker
purports  to  speak from knowledge (Fricker  2006a,  p594).   This  is  a  commitment  in  the public
sphere, but it is also manifested publicly to the audience.  The knowledge norm for tellings follows,
Fricker thinks, from the fact that in telling someone p you offer them your word that p, and commit
to it.  To explain this Fricker draws an analogy with promising - it seemingly follows from the fact
that in promising to perform act a  you commit to doing a, that you should promise to a only if you
7 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to focus on this aspect of the assurance theorist's view. 
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intend to a, and aing is within your power.  Similarly you should not commit to p unless you know
that p.  It is the fact that knowledge is the norm of telling which imbues it with its epistemic force.
Audiences are justified in believing a speaker when they are justified in taking the speaker to be
trustworthy with respect to the particular telling.   The speaker's trustworthiness with respect to  p
consists in her having the following dispositional property: not easily would she assert that  p, or
vouch for the truth of  p, unless she knew that  p (Fricker (2006a) p600).  When you are properly
justified in taking a speaker to be trustworthy, and you know they have acted in such a way that they
are committed to knowing that p, then you are both justified in taking p to be true, and justified in
believing that the speaker's support for p is sufficient to yield knowledge.  Once the audience knows
the speaker has asserted  p, and is in a position to know that the speaker is trustworthy8, then the
audience is thereby in a position to know that  p.   This is how knowledge is spread via assertion
according to Fricker.  
So, according Fricker, speakers don't properly vouch for a proposition if they maintain plausible
deniability with respect to their intention to communicate that proposition, and 'tellings' only occur
when  speakers  do  undertake  such  a  commitment.   Thus,  any  assertion  which  leaves  open  the
mismatch move is not a telling in Fricker's sense.  However, tellings (and the commitments they
generate) are central to Fricker's view of testimonial knowledge.  It is in virtue of the commitments
tellings generate that the knowledge norm applies to them, and it is in virtue of the fact that the
knowledge norm applies to them that they constitute evidence for the proposition asserted.  Thus, in
Fricker's framework, audiences will not be able to achieve testimonial knowledge from any assertion
where the mismatch move is available (unless an alternative story about testimonial knowledge is
given to supplement Fricker's 'telling' based view).  If the deniability problem applies to a wide
8 In earlier work Fricker (1994, 1995, 2006b) has maintained that in order to form a justified testimonial belief 
audiences must monitor speakers for trustworthiness.  Presumably it is such monitoring which will grant the 
audience knowledge level justification of the speaker's trustworthiness.  
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range of assertions, or if particular discourses are especially susceptible to the deniability problem,
then this  should sanction either a widespread scepticism,  or a targeted scepticism regarding the
particular discourses in question.
Fricker's view is similar in many ways to the assurance view of testimony advocated by Richard
Moran (2005a), 2005b), Edward Hinchman (2005), and Angus Ross (1986).  Like Fricker assurance
theorists take tellings to be the paradigmatic speech act by which knowledge is transmitted, and like
Fricker they take tellings to generate a special sort of commitment on behalf of the speaker.  Unlike
Fricker assurance theorists take the reasons to believe provided by tellings to be non-evidential (that
is, the epistemic force of testimony does not primarily consist in testimony that p providing evidence
that p).  
Assurance theorists distinguish between two ways in which we may learn something by believing
another's assertion.  Firstly, when someone asserts p we may take this as evidence that they believe
p (or perhaps gain the right to believe that they believe that p), and that, since they are likely to be a
reliable belief former, we should therefore believe that p.  This way of forming beliefs is, according
to the assurance theorist, in principle no different from coming to believe that p through observing
any aspect of an agent's behaviour and judging that they believe that  p.  Indeed, Moran (2005b)
argues that treating a speaker's utterance as evidence about their beliefs may be worse than treating
other behaviour as evidence for their beliefs due to the fact that the evidence provided by assertions
is, by its very nature, doctored evidence (see Keren (2012) for a response).  Assurance theorists also
argue that speakers do not intend for their utterances to be treated as evidence in this way.  Ross
(1986)  argues  that  in  order  to  take  the  evidential  view one  must  judge  another's  utterance  by
reference to further generalisations about their psychology and the conditions under which they are
likely or unlikely to utter particular words.  You need to view the assertion in a 'detached objective
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light, as a natural phenomenon arising from certain causes' (Ross (1986, p72)). Ross observes that
we can obviously view other people's utterances this way, but thinks it is far less clear that we can
view our own utterances this way.    
I cannot at one and the same time see it as up to me what I shall say and see my choice, as an
observer equipped with a theory of speech behaviour might see it, as determined or 
constrained by facts about my own nature. (Ross 1986: 72)
Such an attitude would, according to Ross, be a form of disengagement from one's own actions,
similar to Sartre's 'bad faith'.  In order to take an utterance as it is intended by the speaker we must
not treat it as evidence.  The alternative, according to the assurance theorist, is to treat the speaker's
taking responsibility for the audience's belief as a reason for the audience to hold that belief.  The
idea is that in telling the audience that p the speaker gives the audience permission to epistemically
rely on them.  When we treat the behaviour of others as evidence for their beliefs, and then form
beliefs about the world on the basis of taking others to be reliable belief formers, we do not gain the
ability to hold others epistemically responsible for our new beliefs.  But when others tell us that p,
and we take them at  their  word,  we apparently do.   Moran (2005a) summarises  the distinction
between the two ways of viewing another's testimony as follows:  
Corresponding to the difference between what the speaker 'gives' and what the speaker 'gives
off' is the difference between what I learn from him and what I may learn from what he does 
and how he does it.  Only in the case of what I learn from him, the person, does my relation 
to his belief involve the speaker assuming any responsibility for what I believe, and that 
makes a difference to the type of reason to believe that is obtained in the two cases. (Moran 
2005a: 335)
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So the speaker's public commitment to defend the audience's testimonial belief takes centre stage in
the assurance theorist's view of testimonial knowledge.  It is important to emphasise the role of the
speaker's  intentions  in  generating  these  commitments.   It  is  by  openly  and  intentionally
communicating p that the speaker takes responsibility for the audience's belief.  It is not clear that
one can unintentionally take epistemic responsibility for another's belief.  After all,  consider the
types  of  reactions  we  typically  have  to  an  unintentional  communication  of  a  controversial
proposition.  When the speaker clearly, openly, and intentionally communicates that  p we expect
them to present epistemic reasons in defence of  p, indicating that we expect the speaker to bear
epistemic  responsibility  for  the  communicated  proposition.  However,  when  a  speaker
unintentionally communicates  p we do not expect them to defend the truth of  p,  rather we expect
them to either defend the reasonableness of their preferred interpretation, or apologise for being
unclear (we may also expect some form of compensation for any mishap which resulted from the
miscommunication).   This indicates that  although we sometimes hold the speaker  to  bear  some
practical  responsibility for propositions  unintentionally communicated we do not generally hold
them to bear any epistemic responsibility for such propositions.  The importance of the speaker's
intentions in generating these commitments is emphasised by Moran:
Only with  respect  to  what  I  have  called  ‘personal  expression’,  the  intentional  action  of
expressing one’s belief, is the person in a position to speak for the meaning or epistemic
import  of  what  he  is  attesting  to.  With  respect  to  whatever  else  may  express  itself  in
someone’s  speech  or  other  expressive  behaviour,  while  this  may indeed  be  a  source  of
knowledge  for  the  audience,  they  are  on  their  own  as  far  as  assessing  its  epistemic
significance goes. Since beliefs which are revealed in these ways need not even be known by
the speaker himself, the hearer (or observer) cannot assume that the speaker is in a position
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to offer support or justification for what may be garnered in this way, nor that he speaks with
any authority about the meaning or general significance of the belief which manifests itself
in his speech or other behaviour. (Moran 2005a: 342)
As we observed when discussing Fricker's view, the speaker's public commitment to defend the
audience's belief is precisely the type of commitment the deniability problem undermines.  This is
worrying if the mismatch move is widely available, or if there are particular discourses in which it is
widely  available.   In  cases  where  audiences  have  to  rely  heavily  on  knowledge  context  the
audience's attitude toward the speaker seems to be no less one of trust in the speaker than in the
assurance  theorist's  paradigm cases.   Therefore,  if  the  assurance  theorist  is  correct  that  in  the
paradigm cases we do not treat assertions as evidence then there are a range of utterances which we
do not typically treat as evidence, but which can only provide epistemic reasons in virtue of being
treated  as  evidence  (since  speakers  don't  undertake  the  assurance  theorist's  required  type  of
commitment  in  making  these  utterances).   Once  again  this  sanctions  a  scepticism  about  the
discourses in question.  
Indeed, it seems that the assurance theorist's emphasis on the speaker's intentions makes the problem
especially worrying. This is because the story the speaker must tell in order to maintain plausible
deniability about their own intentions will usually require appeal to little more than claims about
their own internal mental states (over which they have epistemic authority).  In fact a speaker could
even maintain that they were simply not paying attention to what they were saying in order to
maintain that a rather obvious interpretation was unintended.  In such cases we would certainly hold
a speaker responsible for some wrong doing, however we would often still accept that they did not
intend to communicate what they in fact did communicate.  Thus, if the assurance theorist is correct
about the role of speaker intentions in generating the types of commitment required for testimonial
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justification then it will often be fairly easy for speakers to make the mismatch move, meaning that
it will be widely available.  
Of course,  there  are  many commitments  and responsibilities  we undertake when asserting  over
which we do not have intentional control.  For example, we do not have intentional control over
which propositions will  actually be communicated by our utterances.  However, we still  have a
moral  duty not  to  make an assertion  if  it  is  predictable  that  in  doing so we will  communicate
something false9. If we do make an utterance which predictably results in a false belief then we  will
often be held responsible for the resultant belief.  This responsibility is not epistemic, even if we
believe the predictably communicated proposition we are not thereby duty bound to defend its truth.
Nonetheless,  we will  often be held practically or morally responsible  for any misfortune which
results from the false belief.  It may be thought that these commitments are sufficient to provide a
basis for testimonial justification.  We might reason, in a similar way to Fricker, that since we are
committed to not predictably communicating falsities we will try to only predictably communicate
truths.   Thus,  if  a  speaker  makes  an  assertion  such  that  it  is  predictable  that  p would  be
communicated by that assertion this provides evidence that the speaker knows that p.  Such a view
would not provide the kind off anti-reductionist justification the assurance theorist seeks.  However,
speakers  have  far  less  plausible  deniability  over  what  will  be predictably communicated  by an
utterance, so perhaps such a view could at least provide a reductionist account of the role of speaker
commitments in generating testimonial justification whilst mainly avoiding the deniability problem. 
Ultimately I think that this view contains more than a grain of truth.  However, it is not without its
problems.   Firstly,  speakers  are  generally  far  more  careless  about  what  they might  predictably
communicate than what they clearly and openly communicate.  Thus, it is not clear just how often
audiences will be justified in believing that the speaker knows that p on the basis of the fact that the
9 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.  
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speaker made an utterance such that it is predictable that that utterance would communicate p.  This
will depend on just how easily predictable the audience's interpretation was, and on the context (for
example, speakers are likely to be far more careful about what they might communicate in a high
stakes  context  than a  low sakes  context).   Secondly,  although speakers  will  have less  plausible
deniability about what was predictably communicated by their utterance they will might still have
some.  That is, they might have some plausible deniability regarding their own ability to predict the
resultant  interpretation.   This  will  involve  the  construction  of  a  story  about  the  speaker's
representation  of  the  context  at  the  time  of  utterance  such  that  a  reasonable  agent  with  that
representation  could  make  their  utterance  without  being  able  to  easily  predict  that  they would
communicate  p.  Even if such a story fails to establish that the speaker was not in a position to
predict the resultant interpretation it might still convince the audience that their own interpretation
was less obvious to the speaker than they thought, thus making the speaker less criticisable for their
utterance.  Thus it is unclear to what extent such a view does avoid the deniability problem.
So far we have seen why the deniability problem is worrying for views which emphasise the role of
speaker commitments in generating testimonial justification.  In the next section I will consider the
role speaker commitments have been taken to play in shaping the audience's epistemic rights with
respect to their testimonial belief. 
3.2 Deniability and Buck-Passing.
In the previous section I argued that the deniability problem is worrying for those who emphasize
the role of speaker commitments in testimonial justification.  An agent's right to form a testimonial
20
belief  is,  according  to  such  views,  at  least  partly  grounded  in  the  fact  that  speakers  take
responsibility for the audience's belief.  However, some authors have argued that the epistemic role
of speaker commitments extends beyond the justification of testimonial beliefs.  They argue that
testimonial knowledge comes with distinctive epistemic rights which sets it apart from other forms
of knowledge.   These rights  pertain  not  to  our  acquisition  of  testimonial  beliefs  but  rather  our
retention of them in the face of challenges.  As Goldberg (2006) emphasises this illustrates a sense in
which whatever one says about testimonial justification (that is, whether one is a reductionist or an
anti-reductionist about testimonial justification) testimonial knowledge is epistemically distinctive. 
Both  Goldberg  (2006,  2011)  and  McMyler  (2013),  when  discussing  what  is  distinctive  about
testimonial knowledge, have emphasised the fact that audiences have the right to 'pass the buck' in
response to challenges.  That is, when one forms a testimonial belief on the basis of someone else’s
say so one has the right, when challenged to retain one's belief and defer to the original testifier.  For
example, imagine that Sammy tells Lizzie that oats lower cholesterol, and Lizzie then tells Mark that
oats lower cholesterol.  Mark is sceptical and challenges Lizzie's assertion.  At first Lizzie says
something vague about low density fibre and bacteria in the intestines, but Mark is not convinced
and continues to challenge Lizzie's assertion.   At this point Lizzie is able to retain her belief but
defer to Sammy, saying 'Well Sammy told me, ask her about it'.  That is, Lizzie is able to pass on the
responsibility for defending her belief to Sammy, since Sammy was the original testifier.  The right
to pass the buck in this way is a downstream epistemic right which agents acquire through forming
testimonial beliefs. Other belief forming methods (such as perception) do not generate such a right.
Thus, the fact that such rights are acquired seems to be a distinctive epistemic feature of testimonial
beliefs.  Goldberg puts the point as follows:
21
My main contention is that testimonial knowledge is a distinctive kind of knowledge in that 
this sort of knowledge, but no other, is associated with a characteristic expansion in the sorts 
of epistemically relevant moves that can be made by the subject in her attempt to identify the
direct epistemic support enjoyed by her belief. (Goldberg 2006: 133-134)
...this feature of testimonial knowledge reflects the fact that there is something 
epistemologically distinctive about relying on the epistemic authority of another rational 
being: it is because of what is distinctive in relying on the epistemic authority of another 
rational being, that there is a characteristic expansion in the sort of moves that can be made 
in defence of a belief acquired on such authority. The characteristic expansion, I suggest, is 
that testimonial knowledge gives rise to the hearer's right to pass the epistemic buck  after her
own justificatory resources have been exhausted. (ibid: 134)
As emphasised by Goldberg (2006), one can recognise this no matter what one's view of the original
justification for testimonial beliefs.  This is because the rights pertain not to the conditions under
which it is acceptable to form a testimonial belief, but rather the moves one can make when those
beliefs are challenged. Moreover, Goldberg (2011) later argues that these distinctive epistemic rights
derive from rather uncontroversial features of testimony and assertion.  Assuming that assertion has
an epistemic  norm (that  is,  assuming that  the  propriety of  an assertion that  p requires  that  the
speaker be in some way positively epistemically situated with respect to  p) the act of asserting
creates mutual knowledge amongst the speaker and audience that the speaker has performed an
action the propriety of which requires that they are epistemically well situated with respect to  p.
Thus,  when  challenged  the  audience  knows  that  there  is  a  further  body  of  information  (that
possessed by the speaker) to which they can appeal in defence of their belief10.  As emphasised by
10 However, it is unclear to me how these facts alone generate any form of duty in the speaker to defend the audience's 
belief, and thus where the audiences right of deferral derives from.  
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both Goldberg and McMyler these rights are genuinely epistemic since they pertain to the ways in
which agents are answerable for their beliefs (that is, the epistemic responsibilities they bear with
respect  to  those  beliefs).   These  are  taken  to  be  genuinely  epistemic  features  of  testimonial
knowledge  which  are  not  shared  by  other  forms  of  knowledge.  McMyler  provides  a  succinct
statement of his reasoning which is worth quoting in full: 
..the responsibilities involved in epistemic buck passing are genuinely epistemic 
responsibilities, responsibilities that pertain to the way in which cognitive agents are 
distinctively answerable for their beliefs. Belief, I take it, is a commitment-constituted 
attitude. To believe that p is to commit oneself to a positive answer to the question whether p.
A believer is thus answerable for being so committed.  She is open to criticism that bears on 
the content of her commitment, criticism that bears on the question whether p.  Plausibly, one
aspect of the way in which subjects are thus answerable for their beliefs concerns their 
epistemic conduct in the face of reasonable challenges to their beliefs, where reasonable 
challenges to their beliefs involve the presentation of evidence that counts against their 
beliefs. Typically, when confronted with such a challenge, a rational epistemic agent ought to
either find some way to meet the challenge—some basis upon which to rationally discount 
the evidence presented—or else give up her belief. When it comes to beliefs that are based 
on being told something by a speaker, however, an epistemic agent is entitled to maintain her
belief without meeting the challenge herself by instead passing the epistemic buck back to 
the speaker. If an audience comes to believe that p on the basis of a speaker’s telling, and if a
third party challenges the audience’s belief by producing evidence that counts against p, the 
audience is entitled to defer responsibility for meeting the challenge back to the original 
speaker, whereupon the original speaker is epistemically responsible for meeting the 
challenge. (McMyler 2013: 1067-1068)
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I take these considerations to establish that, at least in some cases, testimony generates the right to
pass the epistemic buck, and that this is a genuine epistemic right.  In such cases the believer will be
less responsible for their belief than they would otherwise be. Moreover, this right to defer to the
someone else in defending one's belief illustrates a sense in which such beliefs, and the rights we
have regarding them, are distinctly social.  This brings us to another sense in which the deniability
problem  seems  genuinely  problematic.   The  deniability  problem  undermines  these  speaker
commitments.  This is particularly clear on Goldberg's (2011) statement of the view which rests on
there being mutual knowledge between the speaker and hearer that the speaker has performed an
action  the  propriety  of  which  requires  that  they  are  epistemically  well  situated  to  a  particular
proposition p.  When the mismatch move is available the speaker is able to provide a defeater to this
mutual  knowledge  claim,  meaning  that  they  can  back  out  of  their  commitments.   If  speakers
undertake no public obligation to defend the audience's belief then audiences don't gain the right to
defer to the speaker when challenged.  Thus, when the mismatch move is available audiences will
form testimonial  beliefs  but  will  not  acquire  the  distinctive  epistemic  rights  which  standardly
accompany such beliefs.  If there are discourses which are particularly susceptible to the deniability
problem then audiences will bear more individual responsibility for the beliefs acquired from such
discourse than they think they do (which could lead to overly credulous belief forming).  
So far I have provided two reasons for worrying about the deniability problem.  Before continuing to
consider the scope of the deniability problem for assertions I will provide one further consideration
to establish that it is genuinely problematic.
3.3. Plausible Deniability and Testimony Policing.
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So far I have outlined two reasons to worry about the deniability problem.  First, it  undermines
testimonial knowledge on telling based views.  Secondly,  when the mismatch move is available
audiences will not gain the epistemic rights distinctive of testimonial beliefs, meaning that they will
bear more responsibility for their beliefs than they think they do.  There is one further reason to
worry about the deniability problem.  Usually when someone falsely asserts that p we can criticise
their assertion, and criticise them as an asserter.  People who are caught asserting falsehoods are
publicly labelled as liars.  This is a strong normative assessment, and the chance of being so labelled
provides  a  disincentive  against  asserting  falsehoods.   However,  when  the  mismatch  move  is
available it is far harder to make such an accusation.  The speaker can always respond claiming that
they never intended to communicate the falsehood in question.  Thus, if there are discourses which
are particularly susceptible to the deniability problem speakers in such discourses will have far less
incentive to speak honestly (Goldberg (2013) presses a similar line in order to explain why we
should be sceptical of anonymous internet testimony).   Of course,  we do have other  normative
assessments available.  We can accuse a speaker of being misleading.  However, this accusation
carries  far  less  normative  force,  especially  if  we  cannot  establish  that  the  speaker  has  been
intentionally  misleading.   And  to  establish  such  a  thing  will  usually  require  a  great  deal  of
information about, for example, the speaker's motivations and their knowledge of their audience.  
This concludes the first half of the paper.  I have outlined the deniability problem, argued that there
is no principled reason to hold that it applies only to implicatures, and provided three reasons to
consider it genuinely problematic.  Firstly, it undermines testimonial knowledge if one embraces a
telling based view of testimony.  Secondly, it undermines the distinctive epistemic rights typically
acquired via testimonial belief formation.  And finally it removes the disincentive for speakers to be
intentionally misleading with their assertions. In the second half of the paper my task is to identify
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the scope of the deniability problem for assertions.  
4. THE CONTEXTUALIST PUZZLE.
So far I have outlined the deniability problem, arguing that there is no principled reason to hold that
it  applies  only  to  implicatures,  and  I  have  provided  three  reasons  to  consider  it  genuinely
problematic.  What I have not done is argued that a significant number of assertions actually suffer
the deniability problem.  It is to that task I now turn.  I start by considering a puzzle arising from the
recent  debate  over  context  sensitivity  in  natural  language,  which  seemingly  suggests  that  the
deniability problem is extremely widespread (far more widespread than we would intuitively think).
I then discuss some responses to the puzzle which allow us to narrow the scope of the problem back
down.  We end up with a loose set of criteria for identifying discourses which will be particularly
susceptible to the problem.
The first part of the puzzle is the seemingly widespread context sensitivity of natural language.  The
list of context sensitive uses of language includes indexicals, demonstratives, gradable adjectives,
comparative adjectives, definite descriptions, indefinite descriptions, adverbs, conditionals, modals,
quantifiers,  predicates  of  personal  taste,  possessives,  incomplete  adjectives,  psychological
attributions, moral attributions, perhaps knowledge ascriptions, non-sentential assertion, vagueness,
metaphor, hyperbole, and loose talk.  This constitutes a large portion of our language use.  Some
theorists  (radical  contextualists)  go  even  further,  holding  that  most,  perhaps  even  all,  of  our
language  use  is  context  sensitive.   Such  theorists  note,  for  example,  that  seemingly  context
insensitive terms can be used in many different (and incompatible) ways in different contexts (see,
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for example, Travis (1985), Bezuidenhout (2002)).  They also provide general theories of utterance
comprehension which entail that we always engage in pragmatic processing to recover what is said.
On such views, even when the recovered proposition is the proposition determined by the literal
meaning of the terms used, such processing is employed to determine that it is the literal meaning (if
there is such a thing (see Recanati (2004))) rather than some alternative 'modulation' which is most
appropriate.  
So, it seems that there is a lot of context sensitivity in natural language, especially if you believe the
radical  contextualist.   This  fact  by  itself  shouldn't  worry  us.   What  is  worrying  is  that  the
mechanisms by which we resolve context sensitivity arguably have the same 'ambiguous epistemics'
that  Fricker  argues give rise  to the deniability problem for implicatures.   Cappelen and Lepore
(2004) argue for the radical view that semantic context sensitivity in natural language is restricted to
personal  pronouns,  demonstratives,  temporal  location  adverbs,  and  the  adjectives  'actual'  and
'present'.  One of their main arguments against widespread semantic context sensitivity is that the
mechanisms  which  contextualists  postulate  to  explain  context  sensitive  communication  would
seemingly make communication miraculous.   They quote the following list  of factors to  which
audiences appeal in resolving context sensitivity: 
“(i) Knowledge that has already been activated from the prior discourse context (if any).
(ii) Knowledge that is available based on who one's conversational partner is and on what 
community. memberships one shares with that person.
(iii) Knowledge that is available through observation of the mutual perceptual environment.
(iv) Any stereotypical knowledge or scripts or frames that are associatively triggered by 
accessing the semantic potential of any of the expressions currently being used.
(v) Knowledge of the purposes and abilities of one's conversational partner (e.g. whether the 
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person is being deceitful or sincere, whether the person tends to verbosity or is a person of 
few words etc.).
(vi) Knowledge one has of the general principles governing conversational exchanges 
(perhaps including Grice's conversational maxims, culturally specific norms of politeness, 
etc.).” (Bezuidenhout 2002: 117)
Cappelen and Lepore point out that if we have to rely on all this information just to recover the
content of simple context sensitive utterances such as 'philosophy is fun' then it seems miraculous
that we generally tend to communicate smoothly and successfully with context sensitive terms.  The
fact that we have to rely on such knowledge means that there are many ways the recovery of a given
proposition can go wrong.  This, as we saw, was precisely what generated the deniability problem
for implicatures.  There were many ways the recovery of an implicature could go wrong, thus the
speaker could easily claim that something did indeed go wrong, disclaiming responsibility for the
audience's belief.  To see that we do extensively rely on knowledge context to recover what is said
consider the two leading approaches to context sensitivity.
Saturation:  For  many  sentences  the  phonetically  articulated  elements  don't  exhaust  the
syntactic structure, there are non-phonetically articulated syntactic elements which need to
be assigned values in order for a complete proposition to be expressed.  This is usually taken
to consist in there being hidden variables in the underlying logical form which take particular
types of value11.  Some variables will be bound by linguistic material from earlier on in the
same sentence,  meaning that  their  values  will  be  easily  recoverable.  Indeed,  one  of  the
11 Not all theorists take saturation to be mandated by variables in the underlying logical form.  Some theorists deny the 
existence of such variables, yet maintain that utterances of the sentences in question fail to express full propositions, 
arguing that audiences supply unarticulated constituents in order to fill in the gaps by appeal to the knowledge 
contexts (Carston (2002a), Hall (2008), Perry (2001), Recanati (2004)).  
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primary reasons for positing hidden variables in clauses such as 'it is raining' is that it looks
as if there are longer sentences in which they have a bound reading.  However, when such
sentences are not embedded the audience must employ knowledge context in order to work
out the intended value of the variable (Stanley (2000) pushes this line of reasoning).  
Often the values  which need to  be assigned are complex and fine grained.   For  example,  they
include properties to restrict quantifiers, and comparison classes for gradable adjectives.  The subtle
differences in possible values, and the sensitivity of these values to small changes in the mutual
goals and presuppositions of the speaker and hearer can, in many cases, give the imaginative speaker
scope to make the mismatch move.  Take, for example, quantifiers - in many cases one can claim the
intended range of a given quantifier to be a restriction on the range the audience attributes.  You
merely need to be able to  identify a subset of the domain the audience attributes such that  the
members of that subset have some distinguishing feature, and identify an aim relative to which this
feature would be relevant such that you could, with at least some level of plausibility, have taken it
to be mutually presupposed that it was a conversational aim.  For example, in the quantifier case in
section two the distinguishing feature of the selected subset was that it contained only vegan friendly
beers, and the mutual goal was to identify beers which Sally would be able to drink. Speakers  are
frequently slippery with what they say in precisely this way.
Modulation:  In  cases  of  modulation  a  constituent  has  its  meaning  adjusted,  and  thus
contributes something new to the truth conditions of the utterance.  The concept we end up
with will be related to the concept encoded in the constituent before modulation takes place,
but  will  usually  serve  the  speaker's  purposes  better.   For  example,  a  concept  may  be
narrowed and thereby assigned a new meaning which applies to a subset of the original
extension (e.g. when Sally, who has just left her timid and underachieving boyfriend says 'I
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need a man', the concept encoded by 'man' is narrowed in order to apply only to men with
particular features commonly associated with masculinity (Carston (2002a)).  A concept may
also be loosened to generate a new concept which applies to more things than the original
concept.  Modulation occurs in response to the audience's perception of the demands of the
context.   It  is  controversial  how the process of modulation works.   Some (e.g.  Recanati
(2004))  think  that  potential  meanings  vie  for  cognitive  activation  with  the  most  salient
meaning being assigned.  Others (e.g. Carston (2002a, 2002b), Carson and Wilson (2007))
think that potential meanings are ranked in order of salience and assessed for relevance (a
balance of cognitive effects and cognitive effort) until an expectation of optimal relevance is
met, at which point the meaning which meets the expectation is assigned.  
It should be clear from this that modulation also relies heavily on knowledge context, that the type
of  context  sensitivity it  accounts  for  is  common (consider  how mundane most  of  the examples
were), and that there will often be many ways an audience can go wrong in recovering the correct
proposition.  When discussing saturation it was noted that in cases where the values assigned are
complex the precise values assigned will be very dependent on knowledge context, thus creating a
lot  of  scope  for  genuine  miscommunication,  and  the  mismatch  move.   The  same  is  true  of
enrichment.  Indeed, since enrichment is even less constrained it seems the problem will be even
worse.  Enrichment occurs only in response to the audience's impression of the demands of the
context, and the values involved are less constrained than in cases of saturation, giving even further
scope for the speaker to claim mismatch.  Additionally, speakers can claim to have intended to be
interpreted more or less literally than they were (an option which is not obviously available in cases
of saturation).  All in all, it seems that the problems which arise for saturation not only arise, but are
multiplied in cases of enrichment12.  
12 I think that many contextualists (especially those who focus on modulation and free enrichment) recognise the fact 
that their theories involve the sorts of 'problematic epistemics' pointed to by Fricker. Many of these theorists have 
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We now have the two components of the puzzle generated by contextualism.  Firstly there is reason
to believe that there is a great deal of context sensitivity in natural language, secondly there is reason
to think that this context sensitivity has the same problematic epistemics which gave rise to the
deniability problem for implicatures.  This suggests that the deniability problem is very widespread.
This is a radical conclusion, and one we should be eager to avoid, since it seems quite obvious that
speakers don't have plausible deniability about what they say the majority of the time.  I will now
consider a series of responses to Cappelen and Lepore's challenge which allow us to narrow down
the scope of the problem. 
5. RESPONDING TO THE CONTEXTUALIST PUZZLE.
I have outlined the deniability problem and argued that we have no principled reason to hold that it
applies only to implicatures.  Next I provided three reasons to consider it genuinely problematic.  I
then  presented  a  puzzle  which  seems  to  suggest  that  the  deniability  problem  may  be  very
widespread.  Context sensitivity seems to be very widespread in verbal communication, and such
communication seems to rely heavily on knowledge context.  Cappelen and Lepore have argued that
worried about related problems which their own theories raise for communicative success.  This has led many 
prominent theorists (such as Bezuidenhout   (1997), Carston (2002), Heck (2002), Recanati (2004), and Sperber and 
Wilson (1986))  to conclude that communicative success does not require the precise sharing of contents between 
speaker and audience, but rather entertainment of similar propositions.  They endorse this view partly as a result of 
their recognition of the epistemic difficulties which arise in the recovery of propositional contents.  If communicative
success required that speakers and audiences shared identical contents then communicative success would be rare 
due to the epistemic difficulties involved in recovering a propositional content identical to that intended by the 
speaker (many of these theorists also raise worries about the sharing of Fregean contents). 
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heavy reliance on knowledge context gives a lot of scope for miscommunication, making successful
communication seemingly miraculous.   Thus,  where there is  such heavy reliance on knowledge
context it may appear that there is a great deal of scope for speakers to employ the mismatch move.
In this section I consider a series of responses to Cappelen and Lepore13.  I will argue that these
responses  fail  as  general  responses  to  the  deniability  problem.   Nonetheless,  they  are  worth
considering because they illustrate a sense in  which it  may be harder  for speakers to make the
mismatch move in certain contexts.  We will see that a discourse must have certain features in order
to block plausible deniability for context sensitive assertions.   Thus we will  be able to identify
discourses which are particularly susceptible to the deniability problem. 
Ishani  Maitra  (2007)  has  argued that  certain  contextual  values  are  more  natural  and frequently
applied than others, and that we will assign such values unless we have reason not to.  For example,
if I say 'elephants are big' it will be more natural for you to assign the comparison class of species
rather than some other  comparison class,  for example the class of large mammals.   You would
generally only assess the claim relative to the class of large mammals in response to additional
information which made that reading more likely.  If this is the case then speakers and hearers will
usually converge on the same contents because audiences will  not need to appeal to knowledge
context to a problematic extent.  
 
I think it should be clear that this response won't solve our problem.  Even if it does help to explain
how interlocutors converge on contents it still leaves a lot of scope for speakers to detach themselves
from the proposition recovered.  If the audience settles on the more common or natural reading then
13 Cappelen and Lepore's own position is that we must separate semantic content and speech act content, and that speech
act content but not semantic content is context sensitive.  Many of the same problems arise for their theory as arise for 
the contextualist, because the proposition we will form a testimonial beliefs in will usually not be the minimal semantic 
content, but rather the context sensitive speech act content. 
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the  speaker  may claim that  further  information  should have  been appealed  to  in  interpretation.
Likewise, if the audience moves away from the more common reading the speaker can claim that the
audience drew too much from context and that the common reading was intended.  This is not to say
that  Maitra's  response  is  without  use.   Certainly  in  some  contexts,  and  for  certain  common
conversational tasks, standard meanings for terms emerge.  And certainly in some contexts there will
be  a  meaning so  obviously more  natural  than  all  the  others  that  the  speaker  has  no  scope for
plausible denial concerning what they meant.  But it is far from clear that the majority of cases are
like this.  
A related but more promising response has been provided by François Recanati (2010).  Recanati
doesn't postulate a set of natural or common meanings, however he does postulate that there are
important psychological commonalities which dispose people to converge on the same meanings of
terms, and which enable us to recognize how others intend concepts to be modulated.  For example,
people are disposed to recognise the same similarities between the situation of application for a
concept, and other situations to which the concept does not straightforwardly apply.  As a result they
are able to extend or narrow the use of term a which expresses that concept, perhaps modulating the
concept along these dimensions of similarity to apply to the new case (see also Bolinger (1968)).
Our interpretation is also taken to be guided by sets of implicit biases which are common across
speakers and audiences.  Recanati does not provide any examples of such biases.  However he does
point  to  some  biases  postulated  by  psychologists  working  on  the  early  acquisition  of  lexical
meanings.  For example, it is argued by Bloom (2000) that early acquisition of lexical meaning is
guided by a whole object bias (a bias toward taking a whole object rather than the parts of an object
to be the referent of a term). It is conceivable that a network of such common biases guides our
ordinary interpretation and helps us assign values to context sensitive terms14. 
14 I suspect that this response only secures convergence on similar rather than identical propositions.  This shouldn’t
worry  Recanati  since  he  maintains  that  similarity  of  content  is  sufficient  for  communicative  success  (as  do
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This does not solve the deniability problem.  Firstly, this network of biases and abilities may often
lead audiences in the right direction, but (especially if such biases are rooted in theory of mind) they
will still be dependent on assumptions about the context to which the speaker can appeal to in order
to  claim  miscommunication.   Thus  the  mismatch  move  will  still  be  available.   Secondly,  this
response has a rather narrow scope.  Although there may be similarities, or types of similarity, which
humans  as  a  kind  are  more  disposed  to  recognise,  and  biases  toward  objects  which  can  be
categorised  in  certain  ways,  these  are  extremely  unlikely  to  exhaust  the  range  of  similarity
judgements and psychological mechanisms which guide interpretation.  It would be very surprising
if we were not also guided by similarity judgements and biases which are moulded by our individual
experiences.  This seems especially true when we are dealing with more abstract concepts.  This
creates a greater chance of genuine mismatch, and more scope for speakers to make the mismatch
move. 
A third response draws our attention to communication as a collaborative affair.  It has been argued
that conversational participants don't allow situations to arise where there is any realistic chance of
content mismatch (Perrini (2009), Recanati (2010)).  This is because speakers don't just make an
utterance, get interpreted, and move on.  Rather, there are collaborative checks in place to ensure
understanding. Both speakers and audiences track each other's facial expressions, tone, and body
language for signs of misunderstanding or mismatch.   Additionally,  if there is uncertainty about
what was said the audience asks for clarification (Clark and Krych (2001)).  
In  responding to the deniability problem the thought  would be this:  both audience and speaker
collaborate to establish a shared meaning, and audiences can refer back to this  when a speaker
attempts the mismatch move, thereby blocking plausible deniability.   This response also fails.  It is
Bezuidenhout (1997), Carston (2002), and Heck (2002))).  
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only in  cases  where either  the  audience is  aware  of  their  lack of  understanding,  or  when their
subsequent  interactions  with  the local  environment  indicate  misunderstanding,  that  mistakes  are
corrected.  When the speaker and hearer are not coordinating on a mutual task involving the local
macro level  environment  the hearer will  have nothing to refer to when calling out the speaker.
Additionally,  many  similar  but  epistemically  distinct  contextual  values  (e.g.  quantifier  domain
restrictions) will have very similar behavioural consequences, meaning that misunderstanding won't
immediately generate behavioural evidence of miscommunication.   So the response is somewhat
limited in scope. 
So far I have surveyed a series of responses to Cappelen and Lepore and found them lacking as
responses to the deniability problem.  Nonetheless, I think they can teach us something important.
These responses draw our attention to a set of resources to which an audience can appeal in certain
contexts in an attempt to call out a speaker who is attempting the mismatch move, thereby blocking
plausible deniability.  For example, if there is a clear common use for a term (or common default
contextual value), and the audience reasonably assigns such a value only to be met by the mismatch
move later on, then the audience is able to maintain that the speaker should have been more explicit
about their intention, maintaining that they are partly responsible for the resultant belief.  The same
goes for modulation based on similarity relations and biases.  This is especially true in cases where
there  are  checks  in  place  related  to  some mutual  task.   If  someone  acts  on  the  basis  of  their
understanding, and at that point the speaker fails to flag any misunderstanding, then this goes some
way to confirming the audience's initial interpretation, making it far harder for the speaker to make
the mismatch move without descending into absurdity.  In general, the more the audience is able to
check that they have the correct understanding, and the more obvious the default understandings are,
the harder it will be for a speaker to claim mismatch without absurdity.  
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These  resources  are  rather  limited,  and  in  one-off  instances  they  may often  prove  ineffective.
However, if speakers repeatedly try to employ the mismatch move in order to avoid commitment in
circumstances where these resources are available then audiences will be able to call them out on
their frequent misleading behaviour.  It may be plausible that in a one-off case the speaker intended
the audience to assign a more esoteric meaning to a term than they did.  However, it becomes far
less plausible in a long run of cases.  Repeat offenders will lose plausible deniability.  Moreover,
speakers have motive to avoid appealing to the mismatch move in contexts where checks are in
place, for if they make the move frequently then they will quickly lose credibility as an informant.   
The deniability problem now seems somewhat less worrying.  However, it was only weakened for
discourses  where  audiences  have  the  resources  to  call  out  the  speaker  by  appeal  to  standard
meanings, very obvious ways of extending a meaning, or checks which serve to reliably confirm
understanding.  It is a partially empirical question how many discourses actually have these features.
However, I think it is likely that some important discourses lack them.  The deniability problem still
arises with its full force for such discourses.  These will be discourses in which context sensitivity
(especially more unconstrained context sensitivity such as modulation) is rife, which don't involve
coordination on macro level tasks, where the values or modulated concepts are complex or abstract,
and where there are no highly standardised or clearly stated contextual values.  Such discourses
provide speakers with a lot of scope to make the mismatch move without losing much credibility.
There will be more resources to which speakers can appeal in order to claim misunderstanding, and
fewer checks an audience can appeal to in order to call them out or hold them responsible.    It is not
the  task  of  this  paper  to  establish  conclusively that  any particular  discourse  has  such features,
however several important discourses do seem to be candidates.  For example, religious discourse is
arguably  rife  with  context  sensitivity  (consider  the  many  and  varied  religious  conceptions  of
salvation, love, and even God (see Alston (2005), and Scott (2005) for useful overviews discussing
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the context sensitivity of religious language), it has a highly abstract subject matter, and it is not
clear that there are always sufficient efforts put in place to coordinate on precise explicit meanings.
Likewise much public political discourse seemingly has such features (for example, consider the
possible varied meanings of terms like 'class warfare').  Indeed, this no doubt adds to the stereotype
of politicians as slippery and dishonest.  Another important candidate seems to be ethical discourse
outside of academic settings (where there are often norms which require precision and coordination
on standard meanings).  Such discourse is abstract, arguably context sensitive, and  seemingly lacks
a norm requiring explicit joint efforts to coordinate on  precise meanings.  Of course, it is beyond
the scope of this paper to establish that any of these discourses do have the features in question.
However, given the importance of such discourses in our everyday lives this seems like a worthy
question for further research. 
6. CONCLUSION. 
I have outlined the deniability problem for assertions, explained why it is genuinely problematic,
and presented a line of reasoning which seems to suggest that the problem is very widespread.  I
then looked at several ways of narrowing the scope of the problem back down. It was found that the
deniability problem would be less problematic in discourses with certain features.  I suggested a
selection of important discourses which may still face the problem. 
It is not clear how we should react once we discover that a discourse faces the deniability problem.
I suspect that the correct reaction will vary between different discourses.  One reaction may be to try
and establish a set of precise meanings within the discourse, and eliminate context sensitivity as
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much  as  possible  (for  example,  if  certain  areas  of  academic  discourse  were  found to  face  the
deniability problem, this    would  probably be  the more  appropriate  response).    An alternative
response would be to give less weight to testimony in the problematic discourse.  One could treat
knowledge regarding the subject matter as necessarily personal rather than social.  One could re-
conceptualise the role of apparent testimony in the discourse, perhaps taking it to be expressive, or
seeing it as intended not to bring about belief but rather reflection or some other attitude.  And
another alternative would just be to view the discourse with scepticism.  The plausibility of any
given response will  depend on the discourse in  question.   Finally,  one might  simply choose to
weaken the focus on speaker commitments in one's theory of testimony15.    
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